This paper investigates the impact of domestic investor protection on equity cross-border investment. We bring to light a lower sensitivity of foreign investment to destination countries'corporate governance for those investors enjoying a higher degree of investor protection at home. This evidence is consistent with the conjecture that high standards of corporate governance at home make investors less familiar with problems related to weak investor protection and then less sensitive to this issue when choosing the composition of their foreign portfolio. As an ensuing perverse e¤ect, assets issued by well protected foreign countries are those more severely penalized in portfolios held by investing countries featuring stronger investor protection.
Introduction
This paper investigates the impact of domestic investor protection rights on foreign portfolio investment.
Irrespective of the bene…ts from international diversi…cation of equity portfolios documented long ago (Markowitz (1952) ; Sharpe (1964) ; Grubel (1968) ; Levy and Sarnat (1970) ; Solnik (1974) ) investors still display a strong preference for domestic assets, the so-called "home bias". (French and Poterba (1991) ; Tesar and Werner (1995) , among others). Several attempts have been made to rationalize this evidence. As reviewed in Lewis (1999) and Karolyi and Stulz (2003) , proposed explanations refer to barriers to international investment (Stulz (1981) ; Tesar and Werner (1995) ), behavioral bias consisting in over-optimism of domestic investors toward domestic assets (French and Poterba (1991) ; Strong and Xu (2003) ; Li (2004) ), hedging of background risk such as in ‡ation risk (Cooper and Kaplanis (1994) ) or human capital risk (Baxter and Jermann (1997) ; Pesenti and van Wincoop (2002) ), information asymmetry between domestic and foreign investors. Especially the latter motive has bene…ted strong support in empirical literature and is therefore advocated as a major cause of international under-diversi…cation. Dahlquist and Robertsson (2001) and Kang and Stulz (1997) emphasize that large, …nancially solid, wellknown …rms are preferred by foreigners, thereby underlining the asymmetry between resident and foreign investors. Chan et al. (2005) investigate the determinants of foreign and domestic investment, …nding that familiarity and variables capturing investment barriers have a signi…cant but asymmetric e¤ect on domestic and foreign bias. This evidence is consistent with the conjecture that foreign investors are more vulnerable to information asymmetry than domestic investors.
In this context, corporate governance can be crucially relevant and partially o¤set this lack of information by signalling the quality of the institutions in terms of rights guaranteed to the investor (La Porta et al. (1998) , LLSV (1998) henceforth), and hence, can be particularly in ‡uential on those investors, the foreign ones, more a¤ected by information costs.
The extant literature has so far analyzed the e¤ect of corporate governance in attracting foreign investment (Kho et al. (2009) ; Leuz et al. (2009) ; Giannetti and Koskinen (2010) ), almost disregarding the role played by legislation protecting the investor at home. The only exception to the best of our knowledge is represented by Giannetti and Koskinen (2010) . In their setting domestic investor protection is relevant to the extent that it in ‡uences the portfolio share invested in domestic assets: in weak investor protection countries, portfolio investors'foreign holdings are found to be larger than in countries where minority shareholders are better protected.
We complement their analysis by highlighting a role of domestic investor protection in shaping the composition of the foreign portfolio. If domestic antidirector rights had a linear impact on foreign investment then this should only determine the choice between domestic and overall foreign share (Giannetti and Koskinen (2010) ) and should have no impact on the allocation of the foreign portfolio across destination countries. If instead the domestic investor protection also in ‡uenced the responsiveness of foreign investment to destination country-speci…c corporate governance, then foreign portfolio composition would be a¤ected.
The hypothesis of an even impact of corporate governance on foreign investment is rejected by the empirical evidence that conversely suggests that laws protecting the interests of minority shareholders asymmetrically a¤ect foreign investors featuring various degrees of investor protection at home. Precisely, we bring to light an interesting perverse e¤ect of strong domestic investor protection rules: they dampen the attractiveness of well protected foreign investment relatively more than that of poorly governed countries' assets. Countries with higher corporate governance standards are therefore relatively more underweighted in portfolios held by better regulated investing countries than in portfolios held by countries displaying low investor protection.
We interpret this evidence as follows: minority investors, acquainted to high level of protection of their rights at home, are not very familiar with problems related to weak investor protection and are therefore less sensitive to foreign corporate governance when choosing the composition of their foreign portfolio.
This ‡atter response of foreign investment to foreign protection rights over-penalizes destination countries featuring better protection of minority investor rights that indeed appear more underweighted in portfolio.
In contrast, investors residing in countries su¤ering relatively lax legislation appear more concerned about the level of protection a¤orded by di¤erent countries when choosing how to internationally diversify their portfolio. This turns out in a steeper response of foreign shares to anti-director rights'indexes and therefore to a foreign portfolio relatively more tilted toward assets issued by better governed destination countries' …rms. This result represents the main innovative contribution of this paper to the literature and sheds some new light on the determinants of foreign portfolio allocation.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the linkage between domestic investor protection and home bias. Section 3 describes the conceptual framework and its main testable implications. Section 4 presents the data and some descriptive statistics. Section 5 illustrates and discusses the results. Section 6 …nally concludes.
Home bias and domestic investor protection
In this work we analyze the impact of investor protection laws on stock portfolios held by foreign investors.
The various indexes of shareholder rights adopted in this paper are related to antidirector rights (ADR, hereafter) that measure how strongly the legal system favours minority shareholders against managers or dominant shareholders in the corporate decision making process 1 .
Standard asset pricing models assuming a representative agent predict that di¤erences in observable characteristics of the asset, such as investor rights and …nancial development of the issuing …rm or country, should be capitalized in share prices such that investing in any stock will be a fair investment regardless of the issuer's level of investor protection (Dahlquist et al. (2003) ). However, when accounting for heterogeneity across investors, the equilibrium price discount discloses only the average behavior thus inducing under-or over-investment by those investors for which the price discount is, respectively, too low or too high (Kho et al. (2009) ; Leuz et al. (2009) ; Giannetti and Koskinen (2010) ).
In particular, as noted by Leuz et al. (2009) , this price discount is likely not su¢ cient for investors, such as foreign ones, that plausibly face information problems beyond those of domestic investors. Indeed, the home bias puzzle can be read as evidence of the asymmetric perception of asset characteristics by home and foreign investors thus breaking the representative agent hypothesis 2 . If all investors, domestic and foreign, equally perceived the level of investor protection in country j, this would be perfectly priced and should have no impact on portfolio allocation decisions and all investors would hold the same portfolio irrespective of their nationality. The evidence of a signi…cant positive role played by investor protection in shaping foreign portfolios precisely underlines its stronger impact for foreign investors.
Previous work originating from LLSV (1998) underlines how investor protection a¤ects …nancial market development, that is, the supply of equity, leaving the demand side mostly unexplored. This latter perspective is relevant insofar as one accounts for heterogeneity across investors. Recent work has highlighted the asymmetric impact of corporate governance on di¤erent categories of investors (Leuz et al. (2009); Giannetti and Koskinen (2010) ). Giannetti and Koskinen (2010) show that investor protection impacts …nancial market development by in ‡uencing the demand for equity, because di¤erent classes of investors -speci…cally controlling shareholders and outside shareholders-can di¤er in the bene…ts accruing to them and there-1 As discussed below, we consider as alternative measure to shareholder rights, the LLSV (1998) antidirector rights (ADR) index, the "revised" ADR index (Djankov et al. (2008) ) and the "corrected" ADR index (Spamann (2010) ).
2 Gehrig (1993) and Kang and Stulz (1997) , among others, focus on the role played by information asymmetry in determining the home bias evidence. See Lewis (1999) for a comprehensive review on the home bias literature. fore in their willingness to pay for stocks. Leuz et al. (2009) investigate the impact of …rm-level corporate governance on foreign holdings and …nd that US investors invest less in foreign …rms with poor outsider protection and opaque earnings. In particular, they …nd that foreign holdings in …rms with poor governance are driven by information asymmetry. Their identi…cation strategy relies on comparison across countries with di¤erent degree of investor protection: the role of …rms'corporate governance within each country is present only where national level institutions are poor.
However, further heterogeneity might arise also within the group of foreign investors. In particular we are interested in di¤erences in investor protection legislation across investing countries. This heterogeneity dimension matters insofar as, for instance, the domestic level of investor protection to which investors are acquainted in ‡uence the evaluation of foreign protection. In this case, the e¤ect exerted by foreign corporate governance would be correlated with domestic investor protection and thus heterogeneity in international portfolio diversi…cation could emerge.
A conceptual framework
Our theoretical framework hinges on equilibrium portfolio allocations in which investors are supposed to face di¤erent costs from investing in various …nancial markets. According to Gehrig (1993) , foreign investments appear on average more risky to domestic investors-leading to an information-based justi…cation to home bias-and portfolios di¤er among investors depending on their perceived variance-covariance matrix. We adopt this approach allowing for a di¤erent investor-speci…c perceived variability of return for each foreign index included in the investment opportunity set 3 .
Absent any investor-speci…c factor, the "unbiased" portfolio holding of an asset depends, as in standard portfolio choice theory, on asset characteristics (risk and return) 4 . When considering equilibrium asset holdings without investment barriers, all investors ought to hold the same portfolio, i.e., the value-weighted portfolio, in which each asset is weighted according to its share in world stock market capitalization. The 3 Throughout the paper we mainly refer to information barriers rather than generically to investment barriers. The reason is that the focus of the paper is on investor protection legislation that we interpret as a means to overcome information asymmetry hitting foreign investors. We are aware that not all investment barriers are due to information. For example, there may be tax reasons or institutional barriers to capital mobility deterring investors from investing in foreign countries. We control for this possibility controlling for inward and outward capital mobility in column (4) of Tables 5a, 5b and 5c. Alternatively, there might be a capital supply reason: foreign investors may avoid investing in country j because they may not have the same access to private control bene…ts as domestic investors. We account for this possibility by considering the world ‡oat portfolio when deriving the market share of each destination country (Dahlquist et al. (2003) ).
4 Details on the derivation of our stylized model are available in Appendix B.
same portfolio is still universally optimal in equilibrium even in the presence of investment barriers, provided that these barriers identically a¤ect all investors. Conversely, heterogeneity in bilateral-speci…c investment barriers generates a wedge between the investor-speci…c portfolio and the value-weighted portfolio. This wedge depends, in particular, on the distance between the bilateral investment barrier of country l investing in country j and the average barrier calculated over all countries investing in the same asset j.
The optimal portfolio weight in asset j (w lj ) by country l is
where M S j is the market share of asset j in the world market capitalization and D lj represents the relative (to the world average) investment barriers of country l investing in asset j 5 . Investors residing in country l will demand a share of asset j greater than its market share in proportion to 1 D lj , that is the reciprocal of the relative investment barrier 6 .
The ratio w lj M S j can be interpreted as the bilateral foreign bias in asset j of a representative investor in country l. A portfolio share w lj larger than j's market share signals that asset j is over-weighted in country l's portfolio, while a ratio lower than 1 signals that asset j is underweighted 7 .
Estimable equation and testable implications
To estimate (1) we must provide an empirical counterpart to the variable D lj , which is not directly observable.
Our …nal estimable regression can be rewritten as follows 8
We consider i bilateral-speci…c proxies, denoted by X lj and n dummy variables Y lj to capture bilateral investment barriers. If we consider, for instance, the distance between country l and j as an indicator 5 Note that if D lj = 1, i.e., if the investment barrier of country l in country j is equal to the average, then M Sj is optimally held in equilibrium.
6 Our theoretical framework is equivalent to the return-reducing approach of Cooper and Kaplanis (1994) and Chan et al. (2005) . In fact, in equilibrium, what matters is the investment barrier relative to the average. 7 Our stylized theoretical setting ignores relevant factors such as in ‡ation and exchange rate uncertainty, like many other models that focus on barriers to international investment (Dahlquist et al. (2003) ). We only partially account for exchange rate uncertainty controlling for the common currency dummy. Since these factors are unlikely to be strongly correlated with investor protection laws, they are not expected to undermine our results. See Lewis (1999) and Karolyi and Stulz (2003) for a review of the e¤ects of in ‡ation and exchange rate uncertainty on portfolio choice. 8 We include time dummies in all speci…cations: they are not explicitly reported in equation below to save an additional subscript for time.
of investment cost, we expect a negative sign for the associated coe¢ cient: A higher "relative proxy" (e.g., greater distance between investing country l and target country j with respect to average distance) is associated with investor l biasing her portfolio away from country j stocks 9 .
To estimate the above parameters, we adopt a feasible Generalized Least Squares speci…cation that assumes the presence of cross-section heteroskedasticity, time dummies, with a cross-section weight correction of the variance-covariance matrix 10 .
All equilibrium factors, that is factors that are common to all investors, domestic and foreign, are priced in equilibrium where market share and market price are jointly determined in equilibrium. In the presence of heterogeneity in the perception of asset variability, the asset price reveals the average perceived variability and a wedge emerges between the actual position (w) and the market share.
When including also K variables capturing country-speci…c factors, such as the antidirector rights index, our speci…cation becomes the following
where k and k represent, respectively, the coe¢ cients of the destination country factors and investing country factors.
Destination speci…c variables equally a¤ecting all investors are already priced by the markets. Since our dependent variable refers to foreign positions uniquely, the evidence of a non null coe¢ cient of a destination speci…c variable implies its di¤erent impact on portfolio positions held by foreign versus domestic investors.
Let us single out our main variable of interest, the antidirector rights index from the pool of K country factors.
If destination country corporate governance (ADR j ) helps foreign investors to reduce the informational gap with respect to local investors, then its coe¢ cient K is expected to be positive. Figure 2 , panel a) represents indeed the relationship between foreign bias and ADR j as a positively 9 We recall that all variables that capture bilateral investment barriers enter our speci…cation in relative terms, i.e., relative to the average world investment barrier.
1 0 Note that censoring is not an issue in our setting since our dependent variable is foreign bias -rather than foreign portfolio share -that is an unbounded variable. sloped straight line.
To provide a graphical representation of the impact of the domestic investor protection (ADR l ) on foreign bias we ideally split the sample of investing countries into two groups: L and H, respectively those featuring ADR below and above the median. We show the case of a negative impact of domestic investor protection (ADR l ) on foreign bias, consistent with Giannetti and Koskinen (2010) 11 . Giannetti and Koskinen (2010) indeed derive a model where, for given wealth distribution, participation in domestic stock market is lower in countries with poor investor protection because they o¤er lower security returns. This implies that portfolio investors from countries with weak investor protection invest abroad more than those from countries with stronger investor protection. We …nd indeed that in most regression speci…cations K < 0: However, neither the sign nor the statistical signi…cance of the coe¢ cient are stable 12 .
We conjecture that the instability of the sign of the coe¢ cient of ADR l can hide some form of nonlinearity in its e¤ect 13 . In particular we suspect that it a¤ects the sensitivity of foreign portfolio investment to ADR j . Note that the results represented in panel a) are derived by imposing an equal coe¢ cient of ADR j to all investing countries.
To test the hypothesis that ADR j equally a¤ects all foreign investing countries we check if its coe¢ cient K does vary across investing countries featuring di¤erent degrees of investor protection. To seize the impact of ADR l heterogeneity on the foreign portfolio composition, we include an interaction term between the investor's ADR l and the destination speci…c ADR j
If the null hypothesis of = 0 were not rejected by the data then we would infer that the same regression slope K holds across investing countries featuring di¤erent internal protection of minority investors'rights.
Our speci…cation including investing ADR l also allows for di¤erences in the intercept capturing, for instance, 1 1 Note that Figure 2 is aimed to provide a graphical representation of the main idea of the paper. The regression line is therefore represented, for ease of exposition , as a univariate regression of the dependent variable w=M S on ADRj. Moreover, the slope is not meant to re ‡ect quantitatively any result in the paper.
1 2 We refer here to columns (1) and (1a) in Tables 5a, 5b and 5c. In three cases out of six the coe¢ cient is negative and statistically signi…cant; in one case the coe¢ cient is negative but not statistically signi…cant; in one case it is positive but non statistically signi…cant; …nally, in one case is positive and statistically signi…cant. 1 3 We have also run a speci…cation (not reported but available upon request) including a quadratic term for the ADR l variable. Results on the instability of the coe¢ cient of ADR l are qualitatively unchanged. a di¤erent overall foreign investment by investing countries featuring various standards of domestic corporate governance.
Note that the alternative hypothesis to the null = 0 can a priori have either sign. A coe¢ cient > 0 could be interpreted as follows: investors enjoying better governance rules at home are more sensitive to corporate governance when choosing the allocation of their foreign portfolio. Conversely, a coe¢ cient > 0 would suggest an opposite scenario: high standard of corporate governance at home makes investors less concerned about the problems related to weak investor protection and then less sensitive to the issue when choosing foreign investment.
The hypothesis of = 0 is rejected by the data in support of the hypothesis of a negative coe¢ cient. This result is robust across all regression speci…cations: the impact of ADR j for investing countries with stronger investor protection legislation is signi…cantly lower than that of countries with weaker corporate governance rules. This highlights an interesting ensuing implication of this wedge in sensitivity of foreign portfolios to ADR j : destination countries with relatively higher ADR are those relatively more underweighted in the portfolio of investors enjoying higher protection at home.
Interestingly, the coe¢ cient of the ADR l term is positive and statistically signi…cant in all speci…cations.
This implies that when ADR j is equal to zero then a higher ADR l induces higher foreign investments. A higher ADR l is therefore associated, other things equal, with a higher intercept and a lower slope of the We can disentangle the two cases by deriving the level of ADR j at which this family of straight lines cross. If it falls below the minimum level of ADR j taken in our sample of destination countries then we are in case described by panel b). Otherwise, if it falls in the range of ADR j covered by our opportunity set then our …ndings are described by panel c) 14 .
1 4 In principle the threshold ADRj could fall above the maximum level taken in our sample. We do not consider this case We aim to …nd the value of ADR j at which the two di¤erent forces of ADR l ; one increasing the intercept and the other ‡attening the slope balance each other. That is the value of ADR j such that^
To provide an economic intuition of our …ndings we consider one straight line associated with L countries and one associated with H countries as in Figure 2 w
where on the right hand side we have the predicted foreign bias (denoted by a^symbol) and on the right hand side A = + P 
If we want to …nd the (average) level of ADR j such that the two straight lines cross, then we need to …nd the ADR j such that the predicted foreign bias is equal 15
that is the level of ADR j where the two lines cross 16 .
Recalling that ADR enters our regression in relative terms -i.e. as ratio to the average ADR j -we can infer the threshold level of ____ ADR j above which foreign destination countries starts being held more in L investing countries than in H investing countries.
This threshold ____ ADR j represents the pivotal level of ADR j on which the di¤erent -across investing countries featuring various ADR l -straight lines describing the linkage of foreign bias to ADR j do hinge.
We …nd that ____ ADR j falls within the range of ADR j so that the graphical representation better describing our results is panel c).
because previous results deliver mainly indication on K < 0: Results indeed exclude this case. 1 5 The variables in A are allowed to vary over investing countries. However, for our purposes, we focus on how the forces of corporate governance in ‡uence foreign portfolio, other things equal, consistent with the meaning of the regression coe¢ cients as partial derivatives.
1 6 This explanation follows the stylized …gure and therefore keeps the univariate perspective.
Section 5.4 we will provide more details on the di¤erences in slope across countries with di¤erent ADR l and on the point estimate of ____ ADR j in di¤erent regression speci…cations.
Data and descriptive statistics 4.1 Data
We consider foreign portfolio investments in equities by 14 major investing countries-Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, United King- (2011)). This survey collects security-level data from the major custodians and large end-investors. Portfolio investment is broken down by instrument (equity or debt) and residence of issuer, the latter providing information on the destination of portfolio
The opportunity set is made up of 20 destination stock markets: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hong Kong, Italy, Japan, Korea, Mexico, Netherlands, Portugal, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom, and the United States 1920 .
The full set of regressors included in the analysis is described in detail in Appendix C.2 while its impact on portfolio investment is discussed in next sections.
Descriptive statistics 4.3 Regressors
We show in Table 1 descriptive statistics on the main regressors included in our speci…cation 21 . The …rst three are the main variables of interest of the paper and capture the degree of protection of minority shareholders'rights. The …rst is the antidirector rights (ADR) index that measures how strongly the legal system favors minority shareholders against managers or dominant shareholders in the corporate decision making process (LLSV (1998)). The second is the "revised" ADR reported in Djankov et al. (2008) . The third is the Spamann "corrected" ADR index 22 . We check the validity of our …ndings also under these alternative speci…cations of protection rights indexes. This is necessary both because the focus of the paper is speci…cally on the antidirector rights and because there are substantial di¤erences among the three indexes as shown in Figure 1 .
The other regressors described represent the set of controls. The …rst three controls are time varying institutional variables drawn from Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI, World Bank). In particular we choose, among these indexes, the "political stability", the "control of corruption" and the "rule of law" variable 23 . Three time-invariant country governance variables drawn from LLSV (1998) are then adopted as alternatives: control of risk of expropriation, accounting standards and e¢ ciency of judicial system.
Finally, the last variable captures capital mobility that is restrictions to in ‡ow and out ‡ow of capital and is drawn from Economic Freedom Network.
It is worth stressing that the absolute magnitude of the variables included does not a¤ect per se the size of the associated coe¢ cient since all variables, for consistency with the analytical framework, enter our regression speci…cation in relative terms. Table 2 shows the average domestic portfolio share held by each investing country. For reference, we report in the second column the average market share. The "home bias" statistic, a widely used measure of underdiversi…cation, can be calculated as the ratio of domestic share to market share: A value larger than 1 signals a disproportionate investment in domestic assets. As expected, all countries display home bias: The pervasiveness and magnitude of home bias underlines the asymmetric investment behavior of foreign and domestic investors with respect to asset-observable characteristics. All countries invest internally more than 50 percent of their portfolio, with Austria and Netherlands as the only exceptions 24 . Column (c) reports the overall foreign bias that is the ratio between the foreign share (one minus the domestic share) and the foreign market share (one minus domestic share). Table 2 also reports in column (d) the ADR index (LLSV (1998)) associated to each investing country.
Dependent variable: Foreign bias
At the bottom of the table we compute the correlation coe¢ cient of the ADR index with, alternatively, domestic share investment, market share and overall foreign bias. In bold characters we report statistically signi…cant correlation coe¢ cients 25 . Consistently with Giannetti and Koskinen (2010) , countries better protecting shareholder rights show more concentrated portfolios in domestic assets (column (a), = 0:69).
However, this does not necessarily imply that countries characterized by better protection of shareholder rights diversify less e¤ectively their portfolios. Indeed, consistently with the literature originated from LLSV (1998), the e¤ect of investor protection also operates through the traditional channel: Strong shareholder rights are associated with higher stock market development captured by the country's share in world market capitalization (column (b), = 0:50). Finally, we compute in column (c) the correlation coe¢ cient between the ADR index and the "overall foreign bias" statistic. This correlation coe¢ cient is negative and statistically di¤erent from zero: Countries with better investor protection are characterized by more domestically concentrated portfolios and lower foreign share than less protected countries 26 .
We then devote our attention to foreign portfolio shares in di¤erent destination countries, computed as the ratio of actual share to market share, following equation (1). In Table 3 we report the average foreign share and the corresponding fraction of world stock market capitalization in columns (a) and (b), respectively. Column (c) shows the average bias in several destination countries, obtained by averaging the foreign bias across investing countries. To provide an economic interpretation for this measure, consider that 2 4 We focus on the determinants of foreign equity portfolios. Domestic positions, though not explicitly investigated here, indirectly impact our analysis: The weight of each foreign stock index in the overall portfolio indeed depends on the domestic share. See Giannetti and Koskinen (2010) for a more speci…c discussion of the implications of minority investor rights on home equity bias.
2 5 Our test statistic for the correlation coe¢ cient is t = q n 2 1 a foreign bias equal to 1 implies that foreign assets enter portfolios with a weight equal to its stock market share. The pervasive evidence that the average foreign bias is almost always below unity-i.e., the evidence that foreign assets are generally underweighted-is the mirror image of the strong home bias that can be read from Table 2 . Beyond this common picture, a notable degree of heterogeneity in bias toward various foreign assets emerges: There might exist country-speci…c factors-among which are investor protection laws-making some countries more attractive than others to foreign investors.
The foreign bias ranges from 0.12 for Canada to 1.09 for Sweden which is the only country, jointly (column (c)) is negative but not statistically signi…cant, suggesting that the positive signi…cant e¤ect on the denominator, the market share (column (b)), compensates the positive non signi…cant e¤ect on the numerator, the average foreign share (column (a)). Also, the standard deviation of the foreign bias is negatively, though non signi…cantly, related to the antidirector rights index (column (d)).
Results
In our regression we aim to detect the determinants of foreign portfolio investment relative to the stock market share. Dahlquist et al. (2003) estimate the fraction of shares closely held across 51 countries, …nding that on average 32 percent of shares are not available for trading and cannot therefore be held by foreign
investors. This induces a measurement error in the size of domestic and foreign bias that was neglected by previous literature. These authors construct the world ‡oat portfolio, which considers only shares that can actually be held by investors correcting the for the fraction of closely held shares (Worldscope). In our analysis we consider the fraction of closely held shares as exogenous, correct the asset supply and compute the corrected bias measure. In all our regressions therefore the share in the world ‡oat portfolio replaces the market share as denominator of the foreign bias measure, our dependent variable.
The statistics on foreign bias discussed above reveal a great deal of heterogeneity across both destination and investing countries and point to the importance of analyzing the speci…c allocation pattern of various foreign investors. This paper focuses on the role of foreign and domestic ADR on cross-border equity positions. However, other factors in ‡uencing international portfolio investments need to be accounted for.
The existence of national speci…cities makes actually crucial to control for bilateral-speci…c factors whose impact cannot be priced by the market.
Proximity regressors
In particular, the literature has stressed how market proximity captures the in ‡uence of asymmetric information on investor portfolio choice (Gehrig (1993) ; Brennan and Cao (1997) ; Kang and Stulz (1997) ).
Many empirical contributions …nd that the cultural and geographic proximity of the market has an important in ‡uence on investor stock holdings and trading (Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001) ; Chan et al. (2005) ; Portes and Rey (2005) ).
In column 1 of Table 4 we report a …rst speci…cation explaining portfolio bias (w lj =M S j ) that includes standard gravity variables such as distance, common border dummy and common language dummy 27 . The common border (language) dummy takes the value 1 if the investing and destination country share a common border (language) and 0 otherwise. The …rst two variables, distance and common border, simply capture the physical distance between investing and destination country. Since transactions in …nancial assets are "weightless", a role for distance may be found only if it has informational content (Portes and Rey (2005)) 28 .
The role of the common language dummy is immediately interpretable, since foreign languages make collecting information more di¢ cult 29 . These variables play an economically and statistically signi…cant role in explaining the dependent variable with a particularly strong impact of the common border dummy 30 .
We then account for other variables capturing bilateral-speci…c linkages: namely, common currency area (EMU), and common legal origin. The EMU dummy takes the value 1 if the investing and destination countries are EMU members and 0 otherwise. The coe¢ cient is positive and signi…cant : EMU membership boosts bias by 0.56 compared to non member countries. Our …ndings are qualitatively consistent with the evidence of Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) and Balta and Delgado (2009) , who …nd, as a result of monetary integration, a notable increase in foreign investments in the Euro area by EMU countries.
Finally, sharing the same legal origin might encourage cross-border investment since there is less fear of unknown factors (Lane (2006) ; Guiso et al. (2009) 
The role of the ADR index
After controlling for proximity regressors, we shift our analysis to the ADR index, the variable representing the focus of our paper 32 .
We start analyzing the role of destination-country ADR (ADR j ):Any asset-speci…c factor should be properly capitalized into the asset's market price (Dahlquist et al. (2003) ) unless there is any heterogeneity in its evaluation on the part of investors. If it is the case then investor protection does not only a¤ect the supply but also the demand side 33 .
Results on the positive e¤ect of shareholder rights on foreign investments are shown in column (2) of Table 4 and are qualitatively consistent with recent evidence reported by Kho et al. (2009) , Leuz et al. (2009) , Giannetti and Koskinen (2010) and Thapa and Poshakwale (2011) . Speci…cally, we …nd that an increase by 1 of the ADR index with respect to the average induces a 0.3 increase in foreign bias.
The evidence that country j's ADR signi…cantly impacts foreign investment implies that, within the universe of investors holding assets j, domestic and foreign investors di¤er in the evaluation of the same factor, that is, they asymmetrically evaluate investor protection rights. This outcome can be easily rationalized from a foreign investor's perspective because, as the literature shows, foreign investors are relatively more severely a¤ected by information asymmetry (Leuz et al. (2009) ). Such investors plausibly perceive assets as more risky than do domestic investors (Gehrig (1993) ), such that any institutional devices allowing investors to reduce riskiness are more valuable to foreigners than to domestic investors.
We need to control for other destination-speci…c factors, potentially correlated with ADR j , that, if omitted, can bias the coe¢ cients of the included regressors. Previous literature has documented that fraudulent transactions, bribery, unenforceable contracts, legal and regulation complexity can signi…cantly a¤ect portfolio investment (Gelos and Wei (2005) ; Leuz et al. (2009) ).
We include in column (3) institutional variables drawn from Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI, World Bank). These indicators are available since 1996 to 2010 and allow us to introduce time-varying country controls. In particular we choose, among these indexes, "political stability", the "control of corruption"
and the "rule of law" variable 34 . The …rst index captures perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development. The second variable captures perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain. The third index seizes perceptions of the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts. The coe¢ cient of the ADR j variable is only slightly a¤ected after the inclusion of these controls. In column (3a) we run the same regression but accounting for investing-country …xed e¤ects to capture all possible di¤erences across investing countries that may generate di¤erent incentives to international portfolio investment. The coe¢ cient of the ADR j variable is still positive and increased in magnitude from 0.34 to 0.43.
We are interested in seizing, among the investing country-speci…c factors, the role played by the ADR index of the investing country (ADR l ):
First, in column (4) we run a regression with ADR l as the only variable. The coe¢ cient is negative and statistically signi…cant. Since this factor is time-invariant it cannot be identi…ed if …xed investing-country e¤ects are accounted for. Therefore this coe¢ cient captures all factors that are investing country speci…c. In column (5) we control for proximity variables and other investing-country institutional variables described above in order to try to disentangle the role of investor protection in the investing country. The coe¢ cient is reduced from -0.34 to -0.28 but is still statistically signi…cant. In column (6) we include the ADR index for both the investing and the destination countries controlling for proximity variables and institutional country factors. The coe¢ cients have the expected sign and are statistically signi…cant: the coe¢ cient of ADR j ( K ) is 0.41 while the coe¢ cient of ADR l ( K ) is -0.11. These …ndings are con…rmed in column (1a) of Table 5a where instead of time-varying country factor we adopt time-invariant factors 35 . In so doing, on the one hand, we lose the time variability, on the other hand, by accounting for other time-invariant factors we might be able to better pick up the role of investor protection that is time invariant as well. We account for institutional variables that capture the soundness of the economic environment. The …rst one is related to (control of) expropriation risk while the second one captures the transparency of accounting rules.
Control of the risk of expropriation captures government stance toward business while accounting standards are critical to corporate governance in that they render company disclosure interpretable. Aggarwal et al. (2005) …nd that countries with better accounting standards, shareholder rights, and legal frameworks attract more US mutual fund investment relative to benchmark indices. Finally, a solid system of legal enforcement could substitute for weak "law on the books": Active and well functioning courts can serve as recourse for investors aggrieved by management (LLSV (1998)). Sign and statistical signi…cance of the coe¢ cients of our variable of interests are maintained.
These …ndings are graphically represented in …gure 2 panel a) where L and H indicate, respectively, investing countries with ADR l below or above the average. The positive K is represented, qualitatively, by the positive slope of the straight line while the negative K is represented by a lower intercept for H countries than for L countries. Notice that here we are representing …ndings from a regression speci…cation where we an equal sensitivity of investing countries to destination countries'ADR is assumed:
The strong heterogeneity of portfolio holdings across investing countries emerged in the descriptive statistics commented above suggests a divergent evaluation of the same asset characteristics not only between foreign and domestic investors but also among foreign investors. We conjecture that the ADR a¤orded in the investing country is a pivotal factor to explain this evidence.
To test this conjecture we check if the impact of ADR j di¤ers among foreign investors and, more speci…cally, if the di¤erent impact of ADR in attracting foreign investments depends upon the level of ADR enjoyed by investors at home.
In column 2 we report results from a regression speci…cation that includes both the ADR index of the destination country (ADR j ) and its interaction with a dummy variable (dum_high_ADR l ) taking value 1 if the investing country ADR l is (weakly) higher than the average (2.95) and 0 otherwise. Note that in this speci…cation, the absence of the ADR l variable as a separate regressor allows us to control for investing country speci…c e¤ects that also capture, for instance, cross-sectional di¤erences in wealth. In the Giannetti and Koskinen (2010)'s setting indeed di¤erences in wealth originate di¤erent portfolios between foreign and domestic portfolio investors and importantly can determine di¤erent incentives to invest domestically and abroad for investors with various degree of investor protection at home. The coe¢ cient of the ADR j factor is quite high and signi…cant (0.62) and re ‡ects the impact of country j's ADR when dum_high_ADR l is equal to 0 that is when ADR l is below the average. The negative coe¢ cient of the interaction variable (-0.26), con…rmed in column (2a) where time-invariant controls replace time-varying ones, stresses that the higher ADR l the less important is the role of foreign corporate governance in determining foreign investment.
In particular, the coe¢ cient for ADR j is more than halved for investing countries featuring an internal level of investor protection below the mean (from 0.62 to 0.26 in column (2) and from 0.56 to 0.25 in column (2a)).
Finally, after having separately tested for the role of ADR l on the intercept and on the slope of ADR j we jointly study both of them in column (3). We …nd that the coe¢ cient of the ADR l variable after including the interaction term ADR l ADR j is positive and statistically signi…cant (^ K = 0:21) 36 . The coe¢ cient of the ADR j variable (^ K = 0:77) is still positive and statistically di¤erent from zero. The coe¢ cient of the interaction term ADR l ADR j is negative and statistically di¤erent from zero ( = 0:31).
These …ndings provide original evidence on the role of ADR l on international portfolio diversi…cation:
the impact of investing country's investor protection on foreign bias is de…nitely positive for ADR j equal to zero and its impact decreases as far as ADR j increases.
Robustness
As a further control, we include a variable capturing direct investment barriers, that is, restrictions to international capital mobility. The strand of literature trying to explain the lack of portfolio diversi…cation through the existence of barriers to international investment dates back to contributions by Black (1974) , Errunza and Losq (1981) and Stulz (1981) . Since the relaxation of capital controls over the last decades has not signi…cantly induced a parallel drop in the home bias, the direct transaction costs' explanation has been considered inadequate (Ahearne et al. (2004) ). However, there might be institutional linkages between the openness of capital markets and the development of investor protection in a given country and this correlation might bias our results. We adopt an index measuring the restrictions imposed by di¤erent countries on capital ‡ows derived from the Economic Freedom Network (Chan et al. (2005) , among others, adopt the same index) 37 . This index (0-10) measures the restrictions countries impose on capital ‡ows assigning a lower rating to countries with more restrictions on foreign capital transactions 38 . In column (4) we include this (time-varying) index of capital mobility for both investing and destination country.
As a …nal robustness check for our results, in column (5), we drop Hong Kong and Singapore from the opportunity set to control for explicit or implicit restrictions about non-OECD foreign investments, especially for pension funds and life insurance companies 39 .
Our results are robust both to the inclusion of capital mobility controls and to the exclusion of non-OECD countries from the sample.
Alternative ADR indexed: "revised" ADR and "corrected" ADR
Since the main idea of this paper crucially hinges on the quantitative importance of ADR in shaping international portfolios, it is necessary to …nd the same qualitative results under di¤erent speci…cation of the investor protection legislation. It is worth stressing that this represents much more than a robustness check.
The introduction of the LLSV (1998) ADR index aimed to quantify legal rules constituted a pathbreaking innovation and was widely in ‡uential, giving birth to over a hundred published empirical papers. To allow comparability with previous works, we also adopt this index. However, this index has been criticized by a number of scholars for its ad hoc nature, for mistakes in its coding, and most recently for conceptual ambiguity in the de…nitions of some of its components (Pagano and von Thadden (2005) ; Spamann (2010)).
Subsequently, new versions of antidirector rights have been developed to address these criticisms. In particular, the "revised" ADR index (Djankov et al. (2008) ) and the "corrected" ADR index (Spamann (2010) ) 40 .
Indeed, Figure 1 graphically shows how remarkably these three indexes di¤er for the countries included in 3 7 Edison and Warnock (2003) propose an alternative measure of capital controls based on the International Finance Corporation's (IFC) emerging market indices. However, this cannot be adopted here since our analysis is restricted to developed countries.
3 8 See Appendix C.2 for further details. 3 9 According to Davis (2001) , geographical constraints to institutional investors should be negligible for the sample of investing countries and the period analyzed here.
4 0 See the Appendix C.2 for further details on these indexes. our sample. Accordingly Spamann (2010) , …nds that the di¤erence between corrected and original values is such that many empirical results established using the original indexes may not be replicable with corrected values. Consequently, also our results may be potentially invalidated by the use of these alternative indexes.
Table 5b and 5c report results in which the "revised" and the "corrected" ADR indexes replace the original LLSV (1998) index. Comfortingly, all of our main …ndings appear qualitatively robust to alternative speci…cations of the antidirector rights index.
More on the role of domestic ADR
In Table 6 and 7 we investigate more in detail the role of the domestic investor protection. Speci…cally, in Table 6 we quantify the reduction in the impact of ADR j on foreign investment due to investor's ADR l while in Table 7 we more deeply investigate and estimate the range of ADR j on which foreign bias is negatively in ‡uenced by investor's ADR l :In both tables, columns labeled as (3), (3a), (4) and (5) refer to the corresponding columns in Tables 5a, 5b and 5c. Table 6 focuses on the impact of the ADR j on foreign bias as from equation (5), that is (
Regression results provide robust evidence that a higher protectiveness of investors' rights in the home country generates a ‡atter response to foreign corporate governance. A statistically signi…cant di¤erence does not necessarily imply an economically relevant wedge in this impact. This table aims to show the size of this impact across investing countries featuring di¤erent levels of ADR l . For each column we normalize to one the impact of ADR j for the investing country characterized by the lowest ADR l and then derive the relative impact for the median and maximum ADR l . Since in all regression speci…cations the antidirector rights index enters in relative terms and is labeled as ADR; to avoid confusion we indicate original values -that is the numerator of the ratios-by _____ ADR : Values of minimum, median and maximum ____ ADR l are reported in parenthesis. The …rst block refers to the ADR constructed by LLSV(1998), the second to the "revised" ADR as constructed in Djankov et al. (2008) , the third to the "corrected" ADR as reported in Spamann (2010) . We …nd that generally the change in the impact of the ADR j on foreign bias across investing countries is quite large. After normalizing to 1 the value for the country with the lowest domestic ____ ADR l ; the value for an investor featuring a median protection level, goes from 0.8 for the Spamann index to 0.6 for the LLSV (1998) index. The decrease in impact for investing countries characterized by the top level of investor protection is drastic: it goes from 0.5 for the "revised" and the "corrected" index to 0.3 for the LLSV (1998) index. These …gures suggest that the role of ADR l in dampening the role of ADR j in attracting foreign investment is quantitatively large. Table 7 reports the threshold level of ADR j above which the impact of ADR l on foreign bias becomes negative, as from Figure 2 , panel c).
If this threshold level were equal to 0 or anyway below the minimum value taken in our sample then our case could be graphically resumed by Figure 2 , panel b) and our results would be close to Giannetti and Koskinen (2010) . In this case, indeed we would record a generalized lower foreign investment induced by higher domestic investor protection. On the other hand, however, our …ndings would still be novel in that we highlight a di¤erent responsiveness to foreign corporate governance by investors acquainted to various level of domestic protection that in turn generates di¤erences in the foreign portfolio composition.
In contrast, if this threshold level fell within the interval of ADR j attached to the countries belonging to our investment opportunity set then the correct representation would be Figure 2 , panel c). In this case a higher ADR l , other things being equal, determines a higher foreign bias in countries with relatively weak investor protection and a lower foreign bias in countries where minority shareholders'rights are better protected.
To discriminate between these two cases we derive the estimate of ADR j = ^ K = as from equation (6). Since this is a function of estimated parameters, we need to construct the con…dence interval for this point estimate. This allows us to test if ADR j is signi…cantly di¤erent from zero and so to provide support to any of the two hypotheses.
ADR j is distributed as follows
where is derived following the delta method 41 .
Since regressors enter in relative form in our speci…cation, (7) and so we derive the relative standard errors.
In Table 7 we show for all regression speci…cations shown in the text, the threshold index _____ ADR j and, in parenthesis, the standard errors. With the exception of one case out of twelve 42 , this threshold level is 4 1 See, e.g., Weisberg (Weisberg) for a description of the delta method.
4 2 This case corresponds to column (3a) in Table 5a in which the coe¢ cient of the ADR l index (^ K ) is positive but not statistically di¤erent from zero. signi…cantly higher than zero thus lending support to the second hypothesis graphically represented in Figure   2 , panel c). Taking into account that the index in LLSV (1998) and Spamann (2010) version takes only integer values while the Djankov et al. (2008) 's index has pace equal to 0.5, we can notice how the threshold on average approaches the median antidirector rights index from below. All in all, a higher domestic investor protection enhances foreign portfolio investment in countries featuring ADR j below the median while deters investment in countries with relatively stronger investor protection legislation.
The economic intuition of this result is that, since the sensitiveness of foreign investment is dampened for investors enjoying stronger domestic investor protection, then ADR j is less informative. This inevitably bene…ts, compared to other investing countries more reactive to ADR j , those destination countries with poorer ADR j and, consequently, damages countries with stronger legislation.
Summary and conclusions
This paper investigates the impact of domestic investor protection laws on foreign equity portfolios.
We bring to light a lower sensitivity of foreign investment to destination countries'corporate governance for those investors enjoying a higher degree of investor protection at home. Investors acquainted with strong domestic legislation favoring minority shareholders are less concerned about corporate governance in foreign countries when choosing their diversi…cation patterns. This implies a lower responsiveness of their foreign portfolio to host country antidirector rights and determines an ensuing perverse e¤ect on these investors' portfolios: destination countries with relatively higher ADR index are those relatively more penalized in the portfolio of investors enjoying higher domestic protection. Hence for these investors, compared to those enjoying weaker investor protection at home, domestic investment turns out to more severely crowd out investment in better governed foreign countries. Our results go even further uncovering that the lower overall foreign investment of better governed countries highlighted in the recent literature (Giannetti and Koskinen (2010)) hides a peculiar allocation of the foreign portfolio. Other things being equal, countries with stronger protection of investors'rights invest more than other investors in countries with governance standards lower than the median and less than other countries in stock markets where investor rights are less e¤ectively shielded. This latter result represents the main innovative contribution of the present paper to the literature and sheds some new light on the linkage between investor protection and international portfolio diversi…cation and, more generally, on the determinants of foreign portfolio allocation.
Studying how investor protection rights a¤ect the incentives to diversify abroad entails relevant policy implications in terms of the desirability of strengthening investor protection. Our …ndings suggest that the in ‡uence of antidirector rights on cross-border investment is subject to a trade-o¤: Strong investment protection at home, on the one hand, attracts inward investment but, on the other hand, makes residing investors, acquainted to better protection measures, tilt their portfolios towards foreign countries with poorer corporate governance. However, our work is limited to the detection of the e¤ect of investor protection rights on cross-border investments. Further research and a more comprehensive analysis are encouraged to derive general welfare conclusions on the desirability of stronger investor protection to enhance global international portfolio diversi…cation. 
Foreign bias
Notes:
y : The index captures antidirector rights (ADR), following LLSV (1998). *: The average foreign share in country j is computed as simple average of the portfolio share in country j (w lj ) by di¤erent investing countries l: An alternative speci…cation where each investing country enters the average weighted by its market capitalization delivers similar results. **: The average foreign bias in country j is computed as simple average of the bias in country j (w lj =M S j ) by di¤erent investing countries l: An alternative speci…cation where each investing country enters the average weighted by its market capitalization delivers similar results. ***: The standard deviation of foreign bias in country j is computed as the cross-sectional standard deviation around the mean of country l's foreign bias in country j.
Table 4. Foreign bias and ADR
This table reports results of the feasible GLS regression as in Section 3.1 in the text. The dependent variable is the foreign portfolio bias, i.e., the ratio of portfolio share to market share, (w lj =M S j ); where the subscript lj represents the couple investing country l -destination country j. The market share is corrected for the fraction of shares closely held Dahlquist et al. (2003) . Further details on the derivation of the dependent variable are provided in Appendix C.1. Each regressor X (dummy variables excluded) is expressed as the ratio of X to its world average. The ADR index adopted is drawn from LLSV (1998). Further details on the variables included as regressors (time-varying and time-invariant country controls) are provided in Appendix C.2. Constants and time dummies are included but not reported. Cross-section weights standard errors (d.f. corrected) are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate signi…cance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively. Table 5a . Foreign bias and ADR: main …ndings (ADR index, LLSV(1998))
Foreign bias
This table reports results of the feasible GLS regression as in Section 3.1 in the text. The dependent variable is the foreign portfolio bias, i.e., the ratio of portfolio share to market share, (w lj =M S j ); where the subscript lj represents the couple investing country l -destination country j. The market share is corrected for the fraction of shares closely held Dahlquist et al. (2003) . Further details on the derivation of the dependent variable are provided in Appendix C.1. Each regressor X (dummy variables excluded) is expressed as the ratio of X to its world average. The ADR index adopted is drawn from LLSV (1998). Further details on the variables included as regressors (time-varying and time-invariant country controls) are provided in Appendix C.2. In (#a) columns, time-varying country controls are replaced by time-invariant ones. dum_high_ADR l is a dummy variable taking value 1 if the investing country has a ADR l weakly higher than the average (and 0 otherwise).
Column (4) reports result when accounting for restrictions to capital mobility in the destination and investing country. Column (5) excludes from the sample non-OECD destination countries, i.e., Hong Kong and Singapore.
Constants and time dummies are included but not reported. Cross-section weights standard errors (d.f. corrected) are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate signi…cance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively. Djankov et al. (2008)) This table reports results of the feasible GLS regression as in Section 3.1 in the text. The dependent variable is the foreign portfolio bias, i.e., the ratio of portfolio share to market share, (w lj =M S j ); where the subscript lj represents the couple investing country l -destination country j. The market share is corrected for the fraction of shares closely held Dahlquist et al. (2003) . Further details on the derivation of the dependent variable are provided in Appendix C.1. Each regressor X (dummy variables excluded) is expressed as the ratio of X to its world average. The ADR index adopted is drawn from Djankov et al. (2008) . Further details on the variables included as regressors (time-varying and time-invariant country controls) are provided in Appendix C.2. In (#a) columns, time-varying country controls are replaced by time-invariant ones. dum_high_ADR l is a dummy variable taking value 1 if the investing country has a ADR l weakly higher than the average (and 0 otherwise).
Column (4) reports result when accounting for restrictions to capital mobility in the destination and the investing country.
Column (5) excludes from the sample non-OECD destination countries, i.e., Hong Kong and Singapore.
Constants and time dummies are included but not reported. Cross-section weights standard errors (d.f. corrected) are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate signi…cance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively. This table reports results of the feasible GLS regression as in Section 3.1 in the text. The dependent variable is the foreign portfolio bias, i.e., the ratio of portfolio share to market share, (w lj =M S j ); where the subscript lj represents the couple investing country l -destination country j. The market share is corrected for the fraction of shares closely held Dahlquist et al. (2003) . Further details on the derivation of the dependent variable are provided in Appendix C.1. Each regressor X (dummy variables excluded) is expressed as the ratio of X to its world average. The ADR index adopted is drawn from Spamann (2010) . Further details on the variables included as regressors (time-varying and time-invariant country controls) are provided in Appendix C.2. In (#a) columns, time-varying country controls are replaced by time-invariant ones. dum_high_ADR l is a dummy variable taking value 1 if the investing country has a ADR l weakly higher than the average (and 0 otherwise).
Constants and time dummies are included but not reported. Cross-section weights standard errors (d.f. corrected) are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate signi…cance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively.
(1) (1a) (3a), (4) and (5) refer to the corresponding columns in Tables 5a, 5b and 5c. For each column we normalize to one the impact of ADR j for the investing country with the minimum ADR l and then derive the impact for the median and maximum ADR l . Values of minimum, median and maximum _____ ADR l are reported in parenthesis. The …rst block refers to the ADR index constructed by LLSV (1998), the second to the "revised" ADR as constructed in Djankov et al. (2008) , the third to the Spamann "corrected" ADR as reported in Spamann (2010) . LLSV (1998) , the second to the "revised" ADR as constructed in Djankov et al. (2008) , the third to the Spamann "corrected" ADR as reported in Spamann (2010) . ***, **, and * indicate signi…cance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively. This …gure reports the three alternative antidirector rights indexes adopted in the paper.
Source: LLSV (1998), Djankov et al. (2008) , Spamann (2010) 0.00 Strong investor protection, by promoting inward and discouraging outward investment, should be negatively correlated with net asset positions. The di¤erent ADR measures adopted in this paper all capture the degree of protection of minority shareholders. This e¤ect should be therefore detected when analyzing portfolio rather than direct investments and equity assets rather than …xed-term securities. If we found this relation to hold not only for equity portfolio investments but also for other classes of assets the doubt of a spurious relationship would legitimately arise.
In Table 8 we …rst compute the correlation between Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) and domestic investor protection (column (a)). The in ‡uence of legislation protecting minority investors is expected to be null and indeed the correlation coe¢ cient is positive but non signi…cant. Conversely, when considering in column (b) net Foreign Portfolio Investments (FPI)-including both …xed-term securities and equities-a negative correlation, though still not signi…cant, emerges. Note that even when considering the net FPI position scaled by the country market share to account for heterogeneity in the size of the economies analyzed, the correlation becomes more negative but still non signi…cant (column (b1)). Finally, when looking at the net Foreign Portfolio Equity position, the …nancial aggregate directly in ‡uenced by ADR according to our thesis, the correlation becomes more negative (columns (c)-(c1)-(c2)) and signi…cant, both when scaled down by the stock market capitalization of the country (column (c1)) and when considering the ratio Foreign Portfolio Equity Assets to Foreign Portfolio Equity Liabilities (column (c2)) 43 .
These preliminary statistics suggest the existence of a relationship between the domestic ADR and international equity portfolios. However, this linkage need to be con…rmed through a multivariate analysis, carried out in the main text, to identify the speci…c contribution of investor protection rights on top of other competing explanatory variables.
B Theoretical framework
Following Merton (1969) with constant relative risk aversion utility function and constant investment opportunities the vector of optimal portfolio shares takes the well known following form:
where is the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion, w is the vector of weights, is the vector of expected stock returns, r is the risk-free interest rate, i is a vector of ones and is the variance-covariance matrix of stock returns.
We incorporate in this standard setting investment cross-border barriers following Gehrig (1993) approach. In his contribution foreign investments appear on average more risky to domestic investors -leading to an information-based justi…cation to home bias-and the portfolio of each investor is di¤erent depending on the perceived variance-covariance matrix 44 . We consider this approach focusing on foreign investment only, considering a di¤erent investor-speci…c perceived variability of stock returns for each foreign stock index in the investment opportunity set.
Let us denote by C l the N xN positive de…nite diagonal matrix of investment barriers, where the j th diagonal element C lj is the cost of holding country j's stock by country l's investor. Capturing C lj the investment barrier cost for country l investing in j , its reciprocal 1 C lj stands for a variable capturing the investment "advantage" of country l investing in country j. Consequently, the optimal portfolio is no longer universal (w ) but is investor-speci…c (w l )
where l = C l (and therefore
Therefore the equilibrium condition, equating stock demand and stock supply, will be
where MS represents the vector of market shares of stock market indexes (supply side) and the right hand side is the (weighted) sum of stock indexes'demands (demand side).
is a diagonal N xN positive de…nite matrix where the j th diagonal element, j = P L l=1 M S l 1 C lj is the average investment "advantage" in holding asset j across investors, weighted by the market share of each investor's domestic stock market.
4 4 In a standard setting with asymmetric information (Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) ) an informed investor has a lower perceived variance due to its private signal but, at the same time, her perceived expected return is generally also di¤erent from the uninformed investor's. It implies that we should sometimes observe a "foreign-bias" when the domestic investors observe bad signals. What we, instead, label "information asymmetries" throughout the paper is closer to the concept of "model uncertainty" or "Knightian uncertainty" (Epstein and Miao (2003) and Uppal and Wang (2003) ): roughly speaking, the foreign investor's perceived uncertainty is higher than the domestic investor's one, though they observe the same return. This approach may help to understand home bias because small di¤erences in the ambiguity about the return distributions can lead to largely under-diversi…ed portfolio holding. The same reasoning applies when considering allocation in several foreign stock markets rather than the choice between home and foreign assets.
4 5 The matrix is the universal variance-covariance matrix that would prevail in absence of investment barriers.
Let us de…ne D l = C l , where D l is again a diagonal N xN positive de…nite matrix. We can rewrite the above expression (9) as
where D lj = j C lj and 1
C lj and using the equilibrium condition (10) we get the following result
or, in terms of individual asset, the following optimal portfolio weights
M S j is the market share of stock index j in the world stock market,
represents the inverse of relative (with respect to world average) cost of country l investing in asset j. In other words, the investor l will demand a share of assets greater than the market share in proportion to
if the investment barrier for country l is equal to the average then the investor l will hold the value market share of asset j.
C Data appendix C.1 Dependent variables Foreign stock market portfolios
The CPIS dataset contains information on foreign holdings only and does not include domestic positions. In order to derive the foreign portfolio positions in the overall portfolio we need to retrieve the share of foreign assets. To accomplish this objective we drew from Datastream (Thomson Financial) the stock market capitalization of all country indexes and from the International Financial Statistics (IFS ) the outstanding foreign equity portfolio investments and the corresponding liabilities. Accordingly we can derive the "foreign equity share" of country i at time t, F S it
where F A stands for "foreign equity assets", F L for "foreign equity liabilities" and M CAP for "stock market capitalization". After obtaining the foreign share F S it is possible to recover the share of each foreign asset in the overall portfolio.
Market share Market shares refer to the values at the end of December of each year. Source: Datastream, Thomson Financial World ‡oat portfolio The world ‡oat portfolio is a corrected value weighted portfolio obtained by multiplying the market share by a fraction taking into account the fraction of closely held shares reported in Worldscope (Dahlquist et al. (2003) ). We convert our world market portfolio weights into world ‡oat portfolio weights (Dahlquist et al. (2003) , Table 2 ). We keep the conversion coe¢ cient invariant over the time period considered being the fraction of country closely-held shares quite stable over a short time horizon while the most important variability dimension, the cross-sectional one, is properly taken into account.
C.2 Regressors
To assure consistency with the theoretical framework, each variable X (dummy variables excluded) enters our regression speci…cations as the ratio of X to its world average.
Proximity variables Distance
The distance is measured as the Great Circle distance in miles between capital cities of source (l) and destination (j) country. The average distance from a destination country (j) is obtained as weighted (by market share) average of the distance of investing countries. The variable included in the regression is the ratio of the distance l j to the average distance.
Border dummy Dummy variable taking value of 1 if the investing country and the destination country share a common border (0 otherwise).
Language dummy Dummy variable taking value of 1 if the investing country and the destination country share a common language (0 otherwise) EMU dummy (Common Currency dummy) Dummy variable taking value of 1 if the investing country and the destination country are members of the European Monetary Union (0 otherwise). In our case, it coincides with a common currency dummy since do not belong to any other currency union.
Equal legal origin Dummy variable taking value 1 if the investing country and the destination country share the same legal origin of the company law or commercial code of each country (0 otherwise). The countries included in our sample belong to four legal families: English, French, German, Scandinavian.
Antidirector Rights Index The index captures antidirector rights, following LLSV (1998). The antidirector rights (ADR) index measures how strongly the legal system favors minority shareholders against managers or dominant shareholders in the corporate decision making process. This is an index formed by adding one when (1) the country allows shareholders to mail their proxy vote directly to the …rm, (2) shareholders are not require to deposit their shares prior to a shareholders'meeting, (3) cumulative voting for directors or proportional representation in the board is allowed, (4) an oppressed minority mechanism is in place, (5) the minimum percentage of share capital that entitles a shareholder to call for an extraordinary shareholders'meeting is less than 10 percent, or (6) shareholders have preemptive rights that can be waived only by a shareholders' vote. The index ranges from 0 (weak antidirector rights) to 6 (strong antidirector rights).
Revised Antidirector Rights Index The index amends the original LLSV (1998) index (Djankov et al. (2008) ). The revised index relies on the same basic dimensions of corporate law, but de…nes them with more precision.Both the original and the revised anti-director rights indices summarize the protection of minority shareholders in the corporate decision-making process, including the right to vote. The index covers the following six areas: (1) vote by mail; (2) obstacles to the actual exercise of the right to vote (i.e., the requirement that shares be deposited before the shareholders'meeting); (3) minority representation on the board of directors through cumulative voting or proportional representation; (4) an oppressed minority mechanism to seek redress in case of expropriation; (5) preemptive rights to subscribe to new securities issued by the company; and (6) the right to call a special shareholder meeting. The general principle behind the construction of the revised anti-director rights index is to associate better investor protection with laws that explicitly mandate, or set as a default rule, provisions that are favorable to minority shareholders. Methodologically, the key di¤erence between the original and revised indices of anti-director rights lies in the treatment of enabling provisions. See Djankov et al. (2008) for further details.
Corrected Antidirector Rights Index The index is constructed by Spamann (2010) . It is constructed as in LLSV (1998) but a reexamination of the legal data leads to corrections for thirty-three out of forty-six countries analyzed. The correlation between corrected and original values is 0.53.
Time-invariant country controls Expropriation risk ICR's assessment of the risk of "outright con…scation" or "forced nationalization". Scale from zero to 10 with lower scores for higher risk (LLSV (1998)).
Accounting rules Index based on information disclosure and accounting practices (LLSV (1998)). E¢ ciency of judicial system Assessment of the "e¢ ciency and integrity of the legal environment as it a¤ects business, particularly foreign …rms" produced by Business International Corporation. Scale from zero to 10 with lower scores for lower e¢ ciency level (LLSV (1998)).
Time-varying country controls These variables are drawn from the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI, World Bank).
The Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) project reports aggregate and individual governance indicators for 213 economies over the period 1996-2010, for six dimensions of governance: Voice and Accountability, Political Stability and Absence of Violence, Government E¤ectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, Control of Corruption. The six aggregate indicators are based on 30 underlying data sources reporting the perceptions of governance of a large number of survey respondents and expert assessments worldwide. Details on the underlying data sources, the aggregation method, and the interpretation of the indicators, can be found in the WGI methodology paper (Kaufmann et al. (2010) ).
The original indexes range from -2.5 to +2.5 with an average of 0. Since our variables all enter in relative terms, we use the average as denominator and to avoid the zero in the denominator we re-scale the range from 0 to 5 with an average of 2.5. Note that the descriptive statistics' table reports a mean that di¤ers from 2.5 because it reports averages across countries included in our sample rather than global ones.
Political stability and absence of violence This index measures the perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, including domestic violence and terrorism. This index captures perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development.
Control of corruption
This index captures perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as "capture" of the state by elites and private interests.
Rule of law This index captures perceptions of the extent to which agents have con…dence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence.
Capital mobility index The Economic Freedom Network constructs an index (0-10) measuring the restrictions countries impose on capital ‡ows assigning a lower rating to countries with more restrictions on foreign capital transactions.
In decreasing rating order are ranked countries where: a) domestic investments by foreigners and foreign investments by local residents are unrestricted; b) investments are restricted in a few industries within the countries; c) investments are permitted but regulatory restrictions slow the mobility of capital; d) either domestic investments by foreigners or foreign investments by local residents require approval from government authorities; e) both domestic by foreigners and foreign investments by local require government approval.
